-The OpenACS 5.2.0b8 Permissions system allows developers and administrators to
+The OpenACS 5.2.0 Permissions system allows developers and administrators to
set access control policies at the object level, that is, any
application or system object represented by a row in the
acs_objects table can be access-controlled via a simple
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
Although this may all sound easy and wonderful, no developer or
administrator would want to explicitly set access control
rights for every user and every object on a
-site. Therefore, OpenACS 5.2.0b8 has two auxiliary mechanisms for making this
+site. Therefore, OpenACS 5.2.0 has two auxiliary mechanisms for making this
easier: First, the Groups system allows users to be grouped together
in flexible ways. Second, the object model defines a notion of
object context, which allows applications to group objects
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
define simple groupings of users. Each group had a human readable name
and unique ID, and there was a single mapping table that mapped users
to groups. (The actual data model was more complicated because it
-contained a meta-data system much like the OpenACS 5.2.0b8 object type system,
+contained a meta-data system much like the OpenACS 5.2.0 object type system,
but that's not relevant right now.)
The 3.x groups system, while very useful, was limited in few ways. The @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ member of Greenpeace, its members are not necessarily members of Greenpeace.
-OpenACS 5.2.0b8 solves both of these modeling problems by introducing a new
+OpenACS 5.2.0 solves both of these modeling problems by introducing a new
abstraction called a party. Parties have a recursive
definition, and we can illustrate how it works with the following
simplified data model. First, we define the parties
@@ -113,18 +113,18 @@
already know what parties and objects are, but we don't know what
privileges are.
-In OpenACS 5.2.0b8, a privilege models the right to perform some operation on +In OpenACS 5.2.0, a privilege models the right to perform some operation on some object. They are the basic units out of which we build access control policies. For example, in the Unix filesystem we typically implement access control by granting users some combination of -read. write or execute privileges on files and directories. In OpenACS 5.2.0b8, +read. write or execute privileges on files and directories. In OpenACS 5.2.0, the table of privileges is organized hierarchically so that developers can define privileges that aggregate some set of privileges together. For example, if we have read, write, create and delete privileges, it might be convenient to combine them into a new privilege called "admin". Then if we grant a user this privilege she is automatically granted all the child privileges that the privilege -contains. The OpenACS 5.2.0b8 kernel data model actually defines these +contains. The OpenACS 5.2.0 kernel data model actually defines these privileges as follows:
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ permissions to large groups of objects in the site, all at once. We use contexts to achieve this goal.
-In OpenACS 5.2.0b8, an object context is a generalization of the scoping
+In OpenACS 5.2.0, an object context is a generalization of the scoping
mechanism introduced in OpenACS 3.x. "Scoping" and "scope" are terms best
explained by example: consider some hypothetical rows in the
address_book table:
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@
person or a group of people or the general public
(itself a group of people).
-In OpenACS 5.2.0b8, rather than breaking the world into a limited set of scopes,
+In OpenACS 5.2.0, rather than breaking the world into a limited set of scopes,
every object lives in a single context. A context is just an
another object that represents the security domain to which the object
belongs. By convention, if an object A doesn't have any permissions
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@
application. With only row-level permissions it is not obvious how to
reasonably initialize the access control list when creating a
message. At best, we have to explicitly grant various read and write
-privileges whenever we create a message, which is tedious. In OpenACS 5.2.0b8,
+privileges whenever we create a message, which is tedious. In OpenACS 5.2.0,
a reasonable thing to do is to create an object representing a forum,
and point the context_id field of a new message at the
forum. Then, suppose we grant every user in the system read-access to
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@
This displays the title of the note as either a link or plain text
depending on whether or not we have write privileges on the object.
-The if tag is something that the OpenACS 5.2.0b8 template system
+The if tag is something that the OpenACS 5.2.0 template system
defines for you to support conditional presentation. The templates developer guide provides more information about this.
If you study the rest of the system, you will also notice that the @@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ permissions to notes that she wanted to make public or whatever. But that's beyond the scope of this example.
-OpenACS 5.2.0b8 defines three separate mechanisms for specifying access control +OpenACS 5.2.0 defines three separate mechanisms for specifying access control in applications. The Groups data model allows you to define hierarchical organizations of users and groups of users. The Permissions data model allows you to define a hierarchy of user rights. Finally,